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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of lhe 
STATE or UTAH 
CASE NO. 9278 
GEORGE 0. PATTE·RSON and EDNA PATTERSON, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs-
MAX WILCOX and ROBERTA WILCOX, husband and 
wife and BEN D. BRQWNING and MARJORIE 
BROWNING, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
G. 0. PATTERSO,N AND EDNA PATTERSO·N 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 
After hearing the evidence presented, the Trial Court 
ruled that the three-year statute of limitations set forth 
in the Utah Code was a bar to Respondents' claim of fraud 
leaving the only remaining issue before the Court, as stated 
by the Trial Judge, as follows: - (Page 55 of Reporter's 
Transcript) . 
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"THE COURT: I think, as you say, you have covered 
it. I can read these cases and they probably will settle 
it. There are some things I can decide easily. I can 
decide easily the question of the Statute of Limita-
tions here as I have, and there is no doubt in my mind 
but what this is a grant of at least the uranium ores 
there because I can't understand the presence of thi~s 
description in the Deed unless it did. I can see that 
the only thing in my mind now is whether it was in-
tended to convey something more than the uranium, 
and I think counsel pretty well exhausted what their 
views are, and I think that I understand you perfectly 
on it. So I will give my decision from the bench here 
tomorrow morning, gentlemen. Court is in Recess." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" which are 
the written documents in issue in this case were prepared 
the same night as a part of the same transaction by the 
Appellant Ben D. Browning and are set forth in words 
and figures, to wit: 
AGREEMENT 
This agreement made and entered into this 28th day of April, 
1955, by and between George 0. Patterson of Moab, Utah, and Max 
C. Wilcox, of Moab, Utah, 
WITNESSETII: 
For and in consirlcration of the sum of Ten Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($10,000.00), I, George 0. Patterson do hereby quit claim 
to Max C. Wilcox, all of my right, title and interest in and to the 
following described r(lal property: 
30 Mining claims, designated lower Valley, Nos. 1 through 30 
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all located in R 20 E. 31 S. Salt Lake Meridian, as further 
shown by tPe offieial records of the San Juan County Recorder. 
Reserviug nevertheless, surface rights to the said Geo. 0. Pat-
terson. And, all rnineral rights to the following named parcels 
of land, to wit: 
"SE 14 NE 14 ; NE 14 SE 14 ; SE lf4 SE 14; Section 8, and NW~; 
NWIA,SWIA, Section 9 Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian" Commonly known as the W.H. Coefield property. 
And, "The East % of the Northeast Quarter of Section Seven-
teen in Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt Lake Meridian." 
Containing 80 acres. 
Together with an eaf'ement of way to the grantee or his assigns 
to. the above. described parce~s of property_ for the purpose of mining 
sa.~.d properties and conducting all oprations incidental thereto in-
cluding but not limited to exploration, development and surveying. 
Grantors further reserve the right to impose and obligation 
upon these properties to the extent of ten per cent of all minerals 
reserved by this deed as determined by gross mill receipts less haul-
age allo\vance and penalties for high lime content; said ore payment 
to terminate when such payments shall be paid in the sum of 
$5,000,000.00. 
The said Max C. Wilcox, or his assigns, does hereby agree to 
perform the necessary assessment work on the above described real 
property, yearly, said assessment work to commence and be com-
pleted on or before th£ 1st day of July, 1955, and thereafter on or 
betore the 1st day of June, each and every year thereafter. In 
the event the said assessment work is not performed at the times 
specified, said mining claims shall revert to said George 0. Pat-
terson. 
The said $10,000.00 is to be paid at the following rate and in 
the following manner: $5,000.00 in cash, and $5,000.00 in stock in 
a corporation be formed, said stock to be issued at par value. And 
in the event that said corporation is not formed with 90 days from 
the date hereof, then the said Max C. Wilcox agrees to pay the 
said $5,000.00 to the said George 0. Patterson in cash. 
Witness the signature of the parties hereto the day and year 
filst above written. 
Is/ George 0. Patterson 
/s/ Max C. Wilcox 
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Recorded at Request of ----------------------------------------
at ------· ~- Fee Paid $ --------------------------------------
by-----------·----------- Dep. Book ______ Page ______ Ref. ------
~ail tax notice to ------------------ Address ------------------
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and EDNA L. PATTERSON, his wife, 
grantors, of ~oab, County of Grand, State of Utah, hereby QUIT-
CLAIM to MAX C. wn..cox of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah, 
grantee, for the sum of Ten and no/100 -------- DOLLARS, the fol-
lowing described tract of land in San Juan County, State of Utah: 
30 ~ining claims, designated Lower Valley, Nos. 1 through 30 
all located in R 26 E,31 S, Salt Lake Meridian, as further shown 
by the official records of the San Juan County Recorder. Reserv-
ing, nevertheless, surface rights to the grantors, and all min-
eral rights to the following named parcels of land, to wit: 
"SE~NE~; NE~SE~; SE:IA,SElJ4; Section 8, and NW~; 
NW:JA,SW:JA, Section 9 Township 31 South, Range 26 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian" Commonly known as theW. 
H. Coefield property, And, 
"The East % of the Northeast Quarter of Section Seventeen 
in Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt Lake Meridian." 
Containing 80 acres. 
Together with an easement of way to the grantee or his assigns 
to the above described parcels of property for the purpose 
of mining said properties and conducting all operations inciden-
tal thereto including but not limited to exploration, development 
and surveying. 
Grantors further reserve the right and impose an obligation 
upon these properties to the extent of ten per cent of all minerals 
reserved by this deed as determined by gross mill receipts less 
haulage allowance and penal ties for high lime contents; said ore 
payment to terminate when such payments shall be paid in the 
sum of $5,000,000.00. 
Witness the hand of said grantor, this 28th day of April, A. D, one 
thousand nine hundred and fifty five. 
Signed in the presence of • /s/ GEORGE 0. PATTERSON 
/s/ BEN D. BROWNING t /s/ EDNA L. PATTERSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of ) 
On the day of A.D. one thousand nine 
hundred and personally appeared before me 
the signer of the foregoing instrumnt, who duly acknowledge to me 
that he executed the same. 
My commission expires Address: Notary Public. 
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The Appellants in the Statement of Facts in Paragraph 
~3, Page 2 of their brief, ~state that the Plaintiffs "directed 
their attack toward the circumstances surrounding the con-
sideration for the Deed rather than the intention of the 
parties or the provisions of the Deed." 
'fhe Respondents do not feel that this is an accurate 
statement of the facts and calls the Court's attention to 
the fact that the Court admitted testimony of the Plain-
tiff and Respondent George 0'. Patterson and the Defend-
ant and Appellant, Max Wilcox, concerning the negotia-
tions leading up to the signing of the "Agreement" and the 
signing of the "Quit Claim Deed" both dated July 28, 1955, 
and hereinafter for convenience referred to as the "Agree-
ment" and as the "Quit Claim Deed". All of said testimony 
clearly shows the intention of the parties was to deal in 
uranium and vanadium. Respondents rely on the entire 
transcript and particularly the statements in said trans-
cript describing the negotiations leading up to the sign-
ing of the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" and call 
the Court's attention to the repeated reference and dis-
cussions concerning uranium and the conspicuous, ab-
sence of any mention of any other mineral or minerals. 
Reporter's Transcript, page 13, lines 1 through 19 
Reporter's Transcript, page 14, lines 12 through 30 
Reporter's Transcript, page 15, lines 1 through 30 
Reporter's Transcript, page 16, lines: 1 through 30 
Reporter's Transcript, page 17, lines 1 through 30 
The Respondents feel that it is also significant and 
important to state the following: -
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1.. The Defendant Ben D. Browning claims to own 
an undivided fifty per cent interest in the fee simple min-
eral estate in the patented land referred to and described 
in the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim D~eed" (Reporter's 
TrarJscript, page 8, lines 6 through 20). 
2. The said Ben D. Browning dictated, in the middle 
of the night of April 28, 1955, the "Agreement" and "Quit 
Clahn Deed" to Edward M. Garrett, Appellant's attorney 
in this lawsuit, who in turn reduced the same to writing 
in the form set forth above. (See Reporter's Transcript, 
page 40, lines 7 through 13, and page 16, lines 8 and 9, 
and page 17, lines 13 through 30.) 
3. That at the time of the negotiations between the 
Appellants and Respondents and at the time the "Agree-
ment" and "Quit Claim Deed" were dictated by Mr. Ben 
D. Browning to Mr. Edward M. Garrett as aforesaid, Mr. 
Browning was acting not only as attorney for the Appel-
lant, Max Wilcox, but was also seeking to acquire property 
interest for himself. (See 'Reporter's Transcript, page 29, 
lines 20 through 22). 
In addition to the facts above presented which Re-
spondents feel were not fully set forth in the Appellants 
brief, the Respondents call the Court's attention to the 
following facts which appear in the record:-
1. That on October 1, 1958, three years and two months 
after the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" were pre-
pared by Ben D. Browning, the Defendant, Max Wilcox, 
entered into a Grazing Lease, a copy of which was and is 
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attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint, marked "Exhibit A" 
and by reference made a part thereof, which Grazing 
Lease provided, in part, as follows: -
"4. It is further understood and agreed that this Lease 
does not include any mineral rig.hts whatesoever and 
the Lessors specifically reserve the right to occupy 
so much of the surface of the demised premises as 
may be necessary or convenient for any mining oper-
ation conducted by Lessors or those acting by their 
authority and that no compensation will be paid to 
Lessee for such right." 
"It is further agreed between the parties that the 
Lessee upon paying the rent and performing all of 
the covenants and agreements herein set forth to be 
performed by said Lessee, shall at th'e expiration of 
this Lease on September 30, 1968, have the right to 
purchase the surface rights only to the real property 
above described together. with the Taylor Grazing Per-
mits and State Leases herein referred to at a price to 
be determined between the parties." 
Paragraph 9 of the Appellants' Amended Complaint 
reads as follows : -
"D. That on the first day of October, 1958, the Plain-
tiff's, G. 0. Patterson and Edna L. Patterson, husband 
and wife, entered into a Grazing Lease with the De-
fendant, Max C. Wilcox, a copy of which said Lease is 
attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and by reference 
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made a part hereof that sa.id Lease is a valid and ex-
isting Lease and is recognized as such by the Plain-
tiffs." 
In Paragraph 7 of the Defendants' Ansrwer and Coun-
terc1aim to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint they answer 
as follows : -
"Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 9 of 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint." 
On pages 5 and 6 Reporter's Transcript, the following 
statement was made to the Court in an effort to define 
the matters that would require proof and to eliminate 
those that would not require proof, and Mr. Edward M. 
Garrett, Attorney for the Appellants, at that time again 
recognized the Grazing Lease including the references to 
minerals as a valid and subsisting lease : -
"MR. RUGGERI: Now in Paragraph 9 of the Com-
plaint, the Defendants admit that G. 0. Patterson and 
Edna Patterson entered into a grazing lease with Max 
\Vilcox and a copy of the lease is attached to it as 
''Exhibit A" and by reference made a part thereof, 
and a valid and existing lease and is recognized as 
such by the Plaintiffs. There was an argument or dis-
cussion that came up, Your Honor, about this partic-
ular matter and Mr. Patterson entered into a grazing 
lease with the Defendant Max Wilcox and in so far as 
that affects the, his right in that property we recog-
nige that ~as being a valid subsisting lease and appar-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
eutly they do too. That's right, isn't it?" 
"MR. GARRETT: That's correct." 
2. That App€llant Max Wilcox and Respondent George 
0. Patterson had a convers1ation a.bout the properties after 
the signing of the "Agreement'' and "Quit Claim Deed" 
and discussed uranium and vanadium only. (Reporter's 
Transcript, page 18, lines 16 through 23). 
3. The Appellants abandoned the unpatented lode min-
ing claims referred to in the "Agreement" and "Quit 
Claim Deed" aft€r doing assessment work for the ass·ess-
ment year ending July 1, 1955 only. (Reporter's Trans-
cript, page 37, lines 21 through 30, and page 38, line 1, 
and page 36, lines 26 through 29). 
4. The Appellants never bothered to record the "Agree-
ment" or "Quit Claim Deed". (See Exhibits in the file.) 
5. The Appellants never bothered to place any docu-
mentary stamps on said Quit Claim Deed or to have sajd 
''Quit Cl~im Deed" acknowledged so that it could be re-
corded despite the passage of almost five years from the 
date of its execution to the date of the commencement of 
this action. (See Exhibits in the file.) 
6. The Defendant, 1\tlax Wilcox, who is the sole and 
only Grantee named in the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim 
Deed" did not ever convey a fifty per cent interest or any 
interest at all in said property to Mr. Ben D. Browning 
until l\1arch 20, 1960, the day before the trial in this case. 
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(Reporter's Transcript, page 36, lines 6 through 19.) 
The following matters are of common knowledge, 
general geographical knowledge a.nd common historical 
knowledge of which Trial Court and Appellate Court may 
take judicial notice:-
1. That all of the lands involved herein are located 
in Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, State of Utah. 
2. That on April 28, 1955, there was a uranium min-
ing boom on in San Juan County, Utah, and that large de-
posits of uranium and fissionable source materials had 
been discovered in Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, Utah. 
3. That many corporations were being formed by per-
sons eager to make their uranium fortunes. 
4. That no oil of commercial value nor any commercial 
gas source had been discovered in Lisbon Valley at that 
timt!. 
5. It is equally well known and a matter of common 
knowledge in the area of the transactions under consider-
ation that "haulag'e allowance and penalties for high-lime 
content" apply particularly to the practices and milling 
processes rela.tive to the mining and refining of uranium 
and related ores and have no relation to the recovery of 
oil and gas. 
All dark print herein is supplied for emphasis by 
the Respondents. 
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STATEMENT 0'F POINTS 
POINT ONE 
The findin~s of the Trial Court are fully and amply 
supported by evidence properly introduced into the record 
and in a suit of this kind, the Supreme Court should not 
disturb the T,rial Court's Findings of Fact, unless the 
find1ngs are clearly against the preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
POINT TWO 
In construing the "Contract" and "Quit Claim Deed" 
the interpretation of the Court must be on the entire in-
strument and not merely on disjointed or particular parts 
of it in the light of circumstances surrounding the parties 
to the instrument at the time of execution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Findings of Fact made by the Trial Court are 
fully and amply supported by evidence properly introduced 
into record and in a. suit of this kind the Supreme Court 
should not disturb the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, unless 
the findings are clearly against the preponderance of evi-
dence. 
RIESKE v. HOOVER et al, 53 Utah 87, 177 P 228, 
the Supreme Court of Utah said in determining the title 
to certain land: 
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"(1, 2) Unless the findings of the court are against 
the clear preponderance of the evidence, we have no 
power to reverse the judgment. That is the rule, even 
if it be admitted that this, is an equity case, which 
we do not deem it necessary to determine. If it is a 
case at law, as cases in ejectment usually are, unless 
an equitable defense is interposed, then the rule is 
less liberal. In such case, if there is any substantial 
evidence to support the findings, whether by a court 
or a jury, we are powerless to interfere. These rules 
are so well established in this jurisdiction as to become 
a matter of common knowledge among the members 
of the bar and courts of the state. 
"(3) Under either rule above referred to we are of 
the opinion that neither of the exceptions relied on 
by appellants should prevail. Applying the rule most 
favorable to appellants we are not prepared to hold 
that the findings are against a clear preponderance 
of the evidence. This is manifest upon a mere casual 
reading of testimony, the substance and effect of 
which we have endeavored to correctly state. It is not 
necessary to comment on the evidence. It speaks for 
itself. It is to some extent conflicting upon the main 
issue. It therefore became the duty of the Trial Court 
to reconcile the conflict, if possible, and determine the 
facts. The findings' of the Trial Court being unim-
peachable under the errors assigned, the duty of this 
court is plain and unequivocal, unless, the law is con-
trary to our conception. 
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STANLEY v. STANLEY, 97 Utah 520 94 2d 465: 
"(1) The scope of the review on appeal in equity cases 
is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. "This court is 
authorized by the State Constitution to review the 
findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will 
not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that the 
court has misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." Olivero 
v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P 313, 315. 
"To the s.ame effect are Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 
45, 57 P 712; Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P 
63, 66; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P 457; 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P 2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 
532; Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P 2d; Hoyt 
v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P 2d 234." 
PENN STAR MINING CO. v. LYMAN et all, ·64 Utah 
343, 231 p 107: 
"(7, 8) Lest we be misunderstood, we desire to add 
in this connection that we are not passing upon 
nor indicating what effect, if any, the trial court 
should give to this evidence offered on behalf of Ly-
man. That is a question which primarily is within the 
exclusive province of the trial court, or, in case there 
is a dispute or conflict respecting the facts, for the 
jury to determine. But, even though the facts are in 
dispute and are submitted to the jury when they are 
found, the court must nevertheless determine the legal 
effect on the contract." 
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POINT II 
In construing the "Contract" and "Quit Claim Deed" 
the interpretation of the Court must be on the entire in-
strum~ent and not merely on disjointed or particular parts 
of it, in the light of all the circumstances surrounding 
the parties to the instruments at the time of its execution. 
The Appellants take the position that the Trial Court 
cvuld only reach the conclusions it came to by considering 
two matters only. They state on Page 10 of their brief, 
as follows : -
"The record discloses only two possible sources for 
such a conclusion, one of them being the Grazing 
Lease entered into by the Respondents Patterson and 
Wilcox more than three years after the delivery of 
the Deed; the second being, the royalty reservation 
contajned in the Deed." 
The Respondents can sympathetically unders~tand how 
the Appellants would like for their unsupported statement 
to hold, but Respondents, submit as a matter of fact that 
the record literally abounds with compelling evidence show-
ing the intention of the parties was to deal for uranium and 
related hardrock minerals only while it is conspicuously 
silent with respect to any other minerals; the record shows 
tha.t the Appellants themselves wrote the ambiguous 
"Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" which under the cir-
cumstances must be construed most strongly against them 
especially where the author is an attorney. In addition to 
the foregoing, and again contrary to the desires of the Ap-
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pcllan ts, the Trial Court and the Supreme Court has the 
right to take judicial notice of all matters of common 
knowledge. With above matters in mind, the Respondents 
respectfully submit that the following fundamental mat-
ters '\Nere properly considered by the Court in arriving at 
its conclus.ions and that the Court was not limited in the 
manner stated by the Appellants. 
a. The interpretation of the "Agreement" and "Quit 
Claim Deed" read in its entirety including "the reser-
vaton of royalty" mentioned by Appellants. 
b. The circumstances existing at the time of the exe-
cution of the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" as 
shown by extrinsic evidence properly admitted into 
the record by the Trial Court. 
c. The construction to be placed on an ambiguous in-
.. , 
strument when it was written by an attorney act-
ing for himself as· an attorney for the Appellant, 
Max Wilcox, in its preparation. 
d. The practical interpretation placed upon the instru-
lnents by the parties themselves prior to the trial and 
indeed as late as the morning of the trial. (Referred 
to by Appellants as "Grazing Lease"). 
e. l\iatters of which the Court could take judicial 
notice. 
The Respondents will now proceed to discuss the fol-
lowing fundamental rules to the subjects they submit were 
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properly considered by the Trial Court in its determination 
of the intent of the parties~ in the order set forth above .. 
(a) In construing the "Agreement" and "Quit Claim 
Deed" the court was obliged to construe the entire in-
strument. 
The Appellants apparently subscribe to this proposi-
tion as they state on Page 16 of their brief as follows:-
"The rule followed in this State is that the whole 
Deed will be considered and effect given to all its 
terms. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 160 Pac 121. (Utah, Wood 
vs. Ashby, 253, Pac 2d 351 (Utah), Haynes v. Hunt, 
85 Pac 2d 861 (Utah)". 
Respondents also rely upon the three cases cited by 
Appellants and feel that it is appropriate at this time to 
quote portions of said cases· in greater detail than the Ap-
pellants did in their brief. 
COLTHA'RP v. COLTHARP 148 Utah 389, 160 P 121, 
quoting from pa.ge 123: -
"While it is quite true that every word, and of course, 
every phrase must be given its ordinary and usual 
meaning and effect, yet, where unnecessary words a.re 
used in a grant and it is clear that they were not in-
tended by the Grantor as limitations upon the grant, 
but rather as conferring a power which existed by im-
plication of la.w, courts may not cut down the grant 
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merely because useless words are incorporated in the 
instrument. Morover, where words or phrases found in 
different parts of a writing w.hich are repugnant the 
courts must if possible, construe the whole instrument 
so all of its parts may be given sure meaning and 
effect, whether primary or secondary." 
Applying the rule of law to the facts, in this case it 
seems quite apparent that the Trial Court was doing no 
more than reconciling repugnant parts of the ambiguous 
"Contract'' and ambiguous "Quit Claim Deed" which the 
Appellants themselves had prepared and for which am-
biguity they must be held solely responsible. Indeed the 
Quit Claim Deed is susceptible of an interpretation that 
no mineral rights of any kind whatsoever were conveyed 
to the Grantee where the Dead reads, as follows: -
"Reserving nevertheless, surface rights to the Grant-
ors. And all mineral rights to the following named par-
cels of land, to-wit:" 
(Description of the land in which Appellants now con-
tend they own all mineral rights) 
It is submitted that if the Court were to place a literal 
interpretation on the wording of the Deed, as the Appel-
lants would like to have it do when it works to their ad-
vantage, that the Court could only find no minerals of any 
kind whatsoever were conveyed by such a grant as that 
quoted above. 
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HAYNES v. HUNT et al, 96 Uta.h, 348 84 P, quoting 
from page 863 : -
"A more modern rule and that now followed by the 
greater number of the courts is that the whole deed 
and every part thereof is to be taken into considera-
tion in determining the intention of the Grantor, and 
clauses in the Deed subsequent to the granting clause 
are given effect so as to curtail, limit, or qualify the 
estate conveyed in the granting claus·e." 
It seems apparent that the Trial Court was only fol-
lowing the rule stated above when- it considered that the 
references made by the Appellants in preparing the Deed 
to "gross mill receipts," and "high-lime contents" and 
"haulage allowance" as curtailing, limiting and qualifying 
the general term found in the granting clause of of the 
"Quit Cla.im Deed" in question. 
In this connection the Court properly took judicial 
notice of the matter of common knowledge that "haulage 
allowance" and "penalty for high-lime" apply particularly 
to the practices and processes relative to the mining and 
refining of uranium ores and have no relation whatsoever 
to the recovery of oil and gas. 
WO·OD v. ASHBY, 122 Utah 580 253 P 2d 351, quot-
ing from Page 353. 
"It is also established in this State that a. deed should 
be construed ·So as to effectuate the intentions and 
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desires of the parties, as manifested by the language 
made use of in the deed." 
The Appellants in their brief also apparently rely 
heavily upon the case "Western Development Company v. 
Nell, 4 Utah, 2d 112, 288 P 2d 452 upon which the Re-
sponden ts also rely and in so doing quote from said case 
on Pages 453 and 454, a.s follows1: -
(1, 2) Although no similar case has arisen in the State 
of Utah, the problem of the interpretation of a. deed, 
usually an old one, where "mineral~s" or "mineral 
rights" have been reserved and oil and gas have sub-
sequently been discovered on the land is one which 
has been frequently treated in other jurisdictions. 
Were the only question involved the construction of 
the first paragraphs of both the reservation and the 
grant in the instant case, we would have no hesitation 
in endorsing and applying the majority rule that a 
reservation of "minerals" retains the rights to gas 
and oil, unless a contrary intention is manifested, See 86 
A.L.R. 986 and Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab Coun-
ty 33 Utah 114, 83 P. 53 14 L .. R.A., N.S., 1043 holding 
that the expression "mineral1s" is not confined in 
meaning to metals. However, as counsel for Appel-
lants suggests in his excellent brief, cases construing 
minerals as including oil and gas are not necessarily 
opposed to those reaching an opposite result as regards 
the particular instrument under the construction, since 
the intention of the parties controls in the interpreta-
tion, 16 Am. Jr. 527, and where the intention of the 
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parties can be a1scertained from the instrument, arbi-
trary rules of law as to construction will not be invok-
ed, Haynes, v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 85 P. 2d 861. 
"(3) One line of cases views descriptions of rights to 
be exercised in the removal of the sub-surface values 
as restricting the grant whereas the other line of cases 
interprets such rights as enlarging or adding to the 
grant. With such confusion in the authorities and be-
cause logic compels us to recognize as valid either in-
terpretation, we hold that the deeds are ambiguous, 
thus allowing the consideration of extrinsic evidence 
as to the situation of the parties at the time of execu-
tion, the circumstances surrounding the transactions, 
and the intent of the parties. See Hudson & Collins v. 
McGuire, 188 Ky. 712 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148. 
"(4) The trial court admitted the extrinsic evidence 
offered by Appellants, but determined the issue of 
intent against then1. The burden of persuasion re-
mained with the parties who asserted that the grant-
or in both deeds here under consideration intended 
to convey less than the estate attributed by law to the 
word "minerals" and hence, we must examine that 
evidence to determine whether or not it is of such 
substance as to compel a finding that oil and gas rights 
were not intended to be included in the res·ervation 
and grant." 
The court in the Western Development case recogniz-
ed that cases construing- minerals as including oil and gas 
are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an opposite 
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result as regards the particular instrument under construc-
tion since the intent of the parties controls and it is to be 
noted that in the instant case the trial court like the trial 
court in the Western Development case admitted the ex-
trinsic evidence offered by the Respondents but unlike the 
Western Development case determined the issue of intent 
against the Appellants and in favor of the Respondents 
and as stated under the authorities cited under Point No. 
One the finding should not be lightly ove:"'ruled but should 
be sustained whenever possible. 
A prima facie meaning of the words "all 1ninerals" 
must also yield to the intention considering the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the in-
strument was made. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 
160 Pac. 121. Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580 253 P 2d 351. 
Western Development Corporation v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 
288 P 2d 452. See Annotation, L.R.A. 1918A 491, which 
states that cases construing "minerals"· as including oil and 
gas are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an op-
posite result as regards the particular instrument under 
construction, and that the words ''minerals, mines and 
mining rights" do not have an absolute definition when 
used in legal documents, it being necessary to ascertain 
the intention of the parties to the instrument in which the 
term is used. Pridle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48, 178 S.E. 513, 
514, Winsett v. Watson (Tex.) 206 S.W. 2d 656; Dierk 
Lumber and Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Myer, 85 Fed. Supp. 157. 
(b) The question whether the "Quit Claim Deed" con-
veyed the entire mineral estate is to be determined by as-
certaining the intention of the parties thereto at the time 
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and under the circumstances existing when made and exe-
cuted. 
rrhe Respondents do not agree with Appellants' state-
ment set forth on Page 10 of their brief that the Trial 
Court was limited to the "Grazing Lease" and the "reser-
vation of royalty" provisions in the Quit Claim Deed to 
determine the intention of the parties. 
This statement by the Appellants simply is not true 
under the laws as set forth in this jurisdiction for the 
Trial Court not only had the duty to read the entire "Agree-
ment" and "Quit Claim Deed" but it had the additional 
duty to take notice of all the ~surroundings and attendant 
circumstances and to consider the language used in the 
light of such circumstances. 
The Utah Court in Read v. Forced Underfiring Corpor-
ation et al, 82 Utah 529 26 P 2d 325, the Court laid down 
the following rule quoting from Page 327, as follows: -
"Where the language is mixed and susceptible of more 
than one construction, the Court should attempt to 
place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the 
parties to the contract at the time this agreement was 
entered into, so that it may view the circumstances as 
viewed by the parties themselves to be enabled to un-
derstand the language used in the sense with which 
the parties used it. In order to accomplish this pur-
pose it is generally proper for the Court to take notice 
of the surroundings~ and attendant circumstances 
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and consider the language used 1n the light of such 
circumstances." 
The Appellants state in Paragraph 4, Page 2 of the 
brief that "In the lower Court the Respondents directed 
their attack surrounding the considerations for the Deed 
rather than the intent of the parties or the provisions of 
the Deed." The Respondents answer this statement cate-
gorically stating that the only extrinsic evidence and all 
the extrinsic evidence demonstrates beyond any question 
that the parties talked about and bargained for uranium 
and related minerals only, and in this connection the Court's 
attention is particularly drawn to the following parts of 
the said Transcript, to wit:-
Reporter's Transcript, page 13, lines 1 through 19 
Reporter's Transcript, page 14, lines 12 through 30 
Reporter's Transcript, page 15, lines 1 through 30 
Reporter's Transcript, page 16, lines 1 through 30 
Reporter's Transcript, page 17, lines 1 through 30 
Again, the Respondents rely upon the case of Coltharp 
v. Coltharp 148 Utah 389, 160 P 121 cited by Appellants 
and quote from page 122 of said case:-
"The rule of construction applicable to instruments of 
writing, including deeds, in this juri,sdiction 
is that the intention of the parties, as the same is, made 
apparent from the ordinary and generally accepted 
meaning of the language used by them when applied 
to the subject-matter of the writing in the light of 
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surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time, 
controls rather than the mere technical words or 
phrases. Coins v. Hogenbarth, 37 Utah 69, 106 Pac 945; 
Burt v. Stringfellow 45 Utah, 207, 143 P 234; Reese 
Howell Co. v. Brown, 158 Pac 684. 
It is submitted that if the facts of this case are ap-
plied to the rule of law set forth above, the Respondents 
must prevail. 
In applying the generally accepted meaning of the 
language used rather than mere technical words or phrases 
in light of the circumstances at the time, it seems quite 
evident that the parties intended to deal for and convey 
urani urn and related minerals only. 
(c) Where one of the parties to a contract, or one 
directly interested in the subject matter thereof has pre-
pared it, using ambiguous or uncertain language, such 
language will be construed most strongly against the party 
using it, especially when interested party is a lawyer and 
prepares a contract for opposite parties who are laymen. 
In the instant case the testimony clearly shows that 
the negotiations took place in the middle of the night, 
about the 28th day of April, 1955, (during the uranium 
boom in San Juan County, Utah) ; that one of the Appel-
lants, Ben D. Browning, who claims to have an undivided 
fifty per cent interest in the mineral estate in the lands 
in question dictated the "Agreement" and also dictated 
the "Quit Claim Deed" to Edward M. Garrett, Appellant's 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
attorney, who in turn reduced the same to writing and the 
Defendant, Ben D. Browning, in so dictating said docu-
ments was acting for himself and as the attorney for the 
Appellant, Max Wilcox. 
Quoting from R·eporter' s Transcript, page 8, line ·6 
through 21 :-
''MR. RUGGERI: I have alleged here some place in 
the Complaint that, Oh, in Paragraph 5 which 
has been denied, I allege that the Defendants Max 
Wilcox and Ben Browning are, or claim to be partners 
engaged in a mining partnership with respect to the 
transactions and occurrence referred to in this amend-
ed complaint concerning the property herein referred 
to and described in Exhibit C attached hereto and by 
reference made a part hereof. Do you deny that they 
are partners in this deal? 
''MR. GARRETT: Yes, our claim is that they are 
merely co-tenants in this property.' ' 
"1\'IR. RUGGERI: And it is your contention that Max 
owns fifty per cent, an undivided fifty per cent? 
"MR. GARRETT: That is correct. 
MR. RUGGERI: And that Ben owns an undivided 
per cent? 
"MR. GARRETT: That is likewise correct. 
(Quoting from Reporter's Transcript, page 17, lines· 13 
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through 30. Mr. Ruggeri questioning and Mr. 
George o. Patterson answering.) 
"A. Well I don't know if it was anything that would 
amount to anything. Asked Mr. Garrett if he'd go get 
a typewriter and type it up. 
"Q. Did Mr. Garrett go get his typwriter? 
"A. Yes he brought his typewriter in and Mr. Brown-
ing dictated a contract to him. 
"Q. And as Mr. Garrett wrote it down?" 
"A. y es. 
"Q. What about the deed? 
"A. Well the same with the deed. 
"Q. And then did you, were you the, review the writ-
ten agreement? 
"A. Yes. He read it and I read it and I signed it and 
when they called Mr. Wilcox over and had him sign it. 
"Q. Now when you say they called Mr. Wilcox over do 
you remember what was said there? 
"A. I think Mr. Browning said come on, sign this 
agreement, Max." 
(Quoting from Reporter's Transcript, page 29, lines 
20 through 23. Mr. Ruggeri is cross-examining Max 
'Vilcox.) 
"Q. Well you're the one that- Question: Well you're 
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the one that knows. Answer: Well I tell you Ben done 
most of that kind of work. I mean he was my attorn-
ey and he was there. 
"A. That's right. 
(Quoting from R·eporter's Transcript, page 40, lines 
7 through 14. Mr. Ruggeri is cross-examining Max 
Wilcox.) 
"Q. And subsequent to that time all of your dealings 
with Ben Browning excepting for the time that you 
"W·ith Ben Browning, excepting for the time that you 
delivered the stock on the 17th of July, isn't that 
right? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. He was actually physically present during all of 
those times? 
"A. Yes. Yes". 
PENN STAR MINING CO. v. LYMAN et al. 64 Utah 
307, 231 P. 107. 
Quoting from page 110, the Utah Court said:-
" ( 4) There is still another element to which the courts, 
under certain circumstances have re~ourse, in case the 
language in a contract is ambiguous or uncertain, which 
is that, where one of the parties, or one who is direct-
ly interested in the subject matter of the contract, has 
prepared it and has used language which is ambigu-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
ous or uncertain in its meaning, the language will be 
construed most strongly against the party who us~ed the 
uncertain or ambiguous longuage. Although the rule is 
not one of controlling influence, yet, when the evidence 
is in this cas·e, shows that a lawyer, who is an interested 
party, prepared the contract for the Defendants who 
are laymen, the rule has sp·ecial application. 
See also Hawaiian Equipment Co. Limited v. Eimco 
Corporation, 15 Utah 590 207 P 2d 794 and Barnard v. 
Hardy 77 Utah 218, 293 P. 12. 
The Appellants rely and cite the rule of construction 
that a deed should be construed most strongly against the 
Grantor but they completely failed to point out that the 
Appellants are responsible for the ambiguities in the Deed 
they prepared or the attendant rule of construction that 
iR applicable in such situations. 
(d) Where the parties to a contract involving uncer-
tainty as to its meaning have given it the same practical 
construction, that construction will generally be adhered 
to by the Courts in giving effect to its provisions. 
The A~ppellants in Paragraph 3, page 19 of their brief 
make the following S1ta tement: "The findings and decree 
of the lower court holding the terms of a Grazing Lease 
and the terms of the royalty reservation show an interpre-
tation and intent not to convey oil and gas are not 
founded on substantial evidece or any evidence whatsoever 
and must be res~erved." 
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As stated in Respondents' Statements of Facts, the 
conclusion of Appellants is not correct for the reason that 
the finding of the Court is founded on substantial evi-
dence as is apparent from reading the following facts and 
applying them to the law in this jurisdiction as hereinafter 
set forth. In Parag-raph 9 of Respondents' Amended Com-
plaint they pleaded as follows: -
"9. That on the first day of October, 1958, the Plain-
tiffs G. 0. Patterson and Edna L. Patterson, husband 
and wife, entered into a Grazing Lease with the De-
fendant, Max C. Wilcox, a copy of which said Lease 
is attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and by refer-
ence made a part hereof; that said Lease is a valid 
and existing lease and is recognized as such by the 
Plaintiffs." 
Appellants answered the allegation as follows:-
"7. Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 9 
of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint." 
At the opening of the trial Mr. Edward M. Garrett 
specifically stated that the Appellants recognized the Graz-
ing Lease as a valid and subsisting lease when the follow-
ing questions were asked and the following reply given: 
(Reporter's Transcript, page 5, lines 27 through 30 and 
page 6, lines 1 through 9.) 
"MR. RUGGERI: Now in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint 
the Defendants admit that G. 0. Patterson and Edna 
Patterson entered into a Grazing Lease with Max Wil-
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cox and a copy of the lease is attached to it as "Exhibit 
A" and by reference made a part hereof, and is a valid 
and existing lease and is recognized as such by the 
Plaintiffs. There was an argument or discussion that 
came up, Your Honor, about this particular matten and 
Mr. Patterson entered into a Grazing Lease with the 
Defendant Max Wilcox and in so far as that affects 
the, his right in that property we recognize that as 
being a valid subsisting lease, and apparently they do 
too. That's right, isn't it? 
MR. GARRETT: That's correct. 
It is the pos-ition of the Respondents that the Appel-
lants, by admitting that the Respondents and the Appel-
lants recognize the Grazing Lease as a valid and subsjst-
ing lease the morning of the trial as stated above and by 
Appellants admitting in their pleadings that it is a valid 
and subsisting lease, cannot now for the first time on ap-
peal conscientiously assert that the "Trial Court's findings 
with respect to the interpretation of the parties are not 
founded on substantial evidence or any evidence whatso-
ever and must be reversed." On the contrary, it is respect-
fully submitted by the Respondents that the Utah law on 
this issue has been clearly stated in the Utah case of Wa-
satch Livestock Loan Co. v. Lewis & Sharp et al, 84 Utah 
347 35 P 2d 835. Quoting from page 84 of said case, the 
Supreme Court of Utah, said: 
"(5) Further, the banks by their verified pleadings 
having admitted the existence of Exhibit C, that it 
was in full force and effect, and that title and owner-
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ship of lambs to be purchased with moneys of the sec-
, 
ond parties to the agreement were to pass and vest 
in Lewis & Sharp, with full right and power to mort-
gage them, must be held bound by such pleadings. It 
is familiar doctrine that pleadings in a pending cause 
are more than admissions; that until changed they 
are conclusive on the parties pleading them and can-
not be controverted by the pleader either in the Trial 
Court or on Appeal. 1 Bancroft, Code Pleading, 626; 
49 C. J. 122; Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah, 85, 
249 P. 437; Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 71 Utah, 
417, 266 P. 1040, 62 A.L.R. 1232." 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Woodward 
v. Edmunds, 20 Utah 118, 57 P. 848, the Court states on 
page 851: "Where there is any ambiguity in a contract, 
the practical construction which the parties to the instru-
ment ave given it before any controversy arose between 
them should be adopted by the Court. This Court so held 
in Peary v. Salt Lake City, Utah 331, 40 Pac 206." 
In Trucker Sales Corporation v. Potter et al, 104 Utah 
1, 137 P 2d 370, the Supreme Court of Utah on page 372 
made the following statement: 
"It is well settled in this State that where the parties 
to a contract, with full knowledge of the terms there-
of, by their actions before any controversy has arisen, 
place upon it a construction which is not contrary to 
the usual meaning of the language used, the Courts 
will follow that construction. Fowler v. Lawson, 56 
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Utah 420, 191 P. 227; Roberts v. Tuttle, 36 Utah 614; 
105 P. 916; Titton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 
173, 77 P. 758, 107 Am St. Rep. 689; Snyder v. Fidel-
ity Savings Association 23 Utah 291, 64 P. 870; Wood-
ward v. Edmunds 20 Utah 118 57 P. 848; Peary v. Salt 
Lake City 11, Utah 331, 40 P. 206." 
The Grazing Lease, which the Appellant Max Wilcox 
entered into on October 1, 1958, a time prior to the contro-
versy and which all the Appellants admitted in their plead-
ings a.nd at the beginning of the trial to be a valid and 
subsisting lease, contains language which the Respond-
ents submits fully supports the lower Court's finding that 
parties themselves have placed an interpretation of the 
contract and Quit Claim Deed. The pertinent part of said 
''valid and subsisting Grazing Lease" reads, as follows: -
"4. It is further understood and agreed that this Lease 
does IJlOt include any mineral rights whatsoever and 
the Lessors specifically reserve the right to occupy 
so much of the surfa.ce of the demised premises as may 
be necessary or convenient for any mining operations 
conducted by Lessors or those acting by their author-
ity and that no com pen sa tion will be paid to Lessee 
for such right." 
"It is further agreed between the parties that the 
l.Jessee, upon paying the rent and performing all of 
the covenants and agreements herein set forth to be 
performed by said Lessee, shall at the expiration of 
this Lease on September 30, 1968, have the right to 
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purchase the surface rights only to the real property 
above described together with the Taylor Grazing Per-
nlits and State Leases herein referred to at a price 
to be determined between the parties." 
(e) Judicial Notice. 31 C.J.S. 509 defines Judicial 
Notice as follows:-
"Judicial Notice is the cognizance of certain facts 
\vhich judges and jurors may properly take and act 
on without proof and because they already know them. 
lVere it not for the statement of the Appellants., found 
in Footnote 3, Page 16 of their brief, in which they imply 
that the Court must be asked to take judicial notice of 
any particular rna tter and if not asked should be limited 
to matters in the record exclusively, the Res·pondents would 
not have considered it necessary to mention the matter at 
all but since it has been raised, the Respondents feel the 
issue should be met. 
31 C.J.S. 519. "Proof is not required of facts which 
the Court can take judicial notice. The doctrine of 
Judicial Notice isi based on convenience and expediency 
and to say that a Court will take Judicial Notice of a 
fact is merely another way of saying that the usual 
forms of evidence will be dispensed with if know-
ledge of the fact can otherwise be acquired. J udiciaJ 
kno,v·Iedge is not reached by the use of evidence; it is 
a matter pertaining to the judicial function and its 
exercise, like that of an admission, stipulation, or rule 
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of presumption dispenses with evidence as to the point . 
. . . Facts of such com.mon knowledge as to become the 
subject of Judicial Notice without proof are an excep-
tion to the general rule requiring findings of fact to 
be based on the evidence." 
It is submitted without further argument that in this 
case the following matters are the proper subject of Judi-
cial Notice which formed a part of the circumstances ex-
isting at the time the "Quit Claim Deed" in question was 
whitten by the Appellants and executed by the Respondents. 
1. That all of the lands involved herein are located in 
Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, State of Utah. 
2. That on April 28, 1955, there was a uranium mining 
boom on in San Juan County, Utah and that large de-
posits of uranium and fissionable source materials had 
been discovered in Lisbon Valley, San Juan County, 
Utah. 
3. That many corporations were being formed by per-
sons eager to make their uranium fortunes. 
4. That no oil of commercial value nor any commercial 
gas source had been discovered in Lisbon Valley at 
that time. 
5. It is equally well known and the Court found in its 
memorandum decision that as a matter of comn1on 
knowledge in the area of the transactions under con-
sideration that "haulage allowance and penalties for 
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high-lime content" apply particularly to the practices 
and milling process'es relative to the mining and re-
fining of uranium and related ores and have no rela-
tion to the recovery of oil and gas. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
CON~CLUSION·S 
The question here to be resolved is not whether oil and 
gas have often been held to be included within the general 
term "minerals" but whether the parties conveyed and in-
tended to convey mineral rights other than uranium and 
related minerals. The Supreme Court is not called upon to 
determine a general definition; what is being determined 
is whether the particular parties intended by particular 
instruments and language and in view of particular con-
ditions, times and circumstances to include only uranium 
and associated minerals within a particular grant. 
The Trial Court had under consideration before it an 
"Agreement" and "Quit Claim Deed" which was on its face 
susceptible of more than one construction but when inter-
preted under the applicable rules of construction, taking 
into consideration all of the circumstances existing at the 
time of its execution and the practical interpretation plac-
~ed on the documents by the parties themselves, both before 
and after the commencement of the trial, and having seen 
and observed the witnesses before it and being fully ad-
vised in the premises and having made its Findings of 
~..,acts, all of which are fully supported by the evidence and 
having properly determined the legal effect of the convey-
ance in question and having entered its Decree accordingly 
should now be sustained by the Appellate Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
Moab, Utah 
Attorney for Res~pondents 
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